

<b>STN</b>	<b>Profily ochrany kryptografických modulov pre poskytovateľov dôveryhodných služieb Časť 5: Kryptografický modul pre dôveryhodné služby</b>	<b>STN EN 419221-5</b>
		97 6012

Protection Profiles for TSP Cryptographic Modules - Part 5: Cryptographic Module for Trust Services

Táto norma obsahuje anglickú verziu európskej normy.  
This standard includes the English version of the European Standard.

Táto norma bola označená vo Vestníku ÚNMS SR č. 10/18

Obsahuje: EN 419221-5:2018

**127425**

EUROPEAN STANDARD  
NORME EUROPÉENNE  
EUROPÄISCHE NORM

**EN 419221-5**

May 2018

ICS 35.040.01; 35.240.30

English Version

**Protection Profiles for TSP Cryptographic Modules - Part 5:  
Cryptographic Module for Trust Services**

Profils de protection pour les modules  
cryptographiques de prestataires de services de  
confiance - Partie 5: Module cryptographique pour les  
services de confiance

Schutzprofile für kryptographische Module von  
Vertrauensdienstanbietern - Teil 5: Kryptographisches  
Modul für vertrauenswürdige Dienste

This European Standard was approved by CEN on 2 March 2018.

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## **European foreword**

This document (EN 419221-5:2018) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 224 "Personal identification and related personal devices with secure element, systems, operations and privacy in a multi sectorial environment", the secretariat of which is held by AFNOR.

This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by November 2018, and conflicting national standards shall be withdrawn at the latest by November 2018.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

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## Introduction

Clause 4 provides the introductory material for the Protection Profile.

Clause 5 provides the conformance claim.

Clause 6 provides the Security Problem Definition. It presents the Assets, Threats, Organisational Security Policies and Assumptions related to the TOE.

Clause 7 defines the security objectives for both the TOE and the TOE environment.

Clause 8 presents the extended components that will be used in this PP.

Clause 9 contains the functional requirements and assurance requirements derived from the Common Criteria (CC), Part 2 [CC2] and Part 3 [CC3] that are to be satisfied by the TOE.

Clause 10 provides rationales to demonstrate that:

- Security Objectives satisfy the policies and threats;
- SFR match the security Objectives;
- SFR dependencies are satisfied;
- The SARs are appropriate.

A Bibliography is provided to identify background material.

A Mapping to the EU 'Requirements For Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Devices' is provided in Annex A.

## 1 Scope

This part of EN 419221 specifies a Protection Profile for cryptographic modules which is intended to be suitable for use by trust service providers supporting electronic signature and electronic sealing operations, certificate issuance and revocation, time stamp operations, and authentication services, as identified by the (EU) No 910/2014 regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 eIDAS) in [10]. The Protection Profile also includes optional support for protected backup of keys.

The document follows the rules and conventions laid out in Common Criteria Part 1 [CC1], Annex B "Specification of Protection Profiles".

## 2 Normative references

The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 19790:2012, *Information technology — Security techniques — Security requirements for cryptographic modules*

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general model (Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012), CCMB-2012-09-001 [CC1]

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional requirements, (Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012), CCMB-2012-09-002 [CC2]

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance requirements, (Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012), CCMB-2012-09-003 [CC3]

**koniec náhľadu – text d'alej pokračuje v platenej verzii STN**