

STN	Informačné technológie Bezpečnostné metódy Kritériá na hodnotenie bezpečnosti IT Časť 2: Bezpečnostné funkčné prvky (ISO/IEC 15408-2: 2008)	STN EN ISO/IEC 15408-2
		36 9776

Information technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 2: Security functional components (ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008)

Táto norma obsahuje anglickú verziu európskej normy.
This standard includes the English version of the European Standard.

Táto norma bola oznámená vo Vestníku ÚNMS SR č. 08/20

Obsahuje: EN ISO/IEC 15408-2:2020, ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008

130999

EUROPEAN STANDARD
NORME EUROPÉENNE
EUROPÄISCHE NORM

EN ISO/IEC 15408-2

March 2020

ICS 35.030

English version

Information technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 2: Security functional components (ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008)

Technologies de l'information - Techniques de sécurité
 - Critères d'évaluation pour la sécurité TI - Partie 2:
 Composants fonctionnels de sécurité (ISO/IEC 15408-
 2:2008)

Informationstechnik - Sicherheitstechniken -
 Bewertungskriterien für die IT-Sicherheit - Teil 2:
 Sicherheitsfunktionskomponenten (ISO/IEC 15408-
 2:2008)

This European Standard was approved by CEN on 2 March 2020.

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European foreword

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**INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD****ISO/IEC
15408-2**Third edition
2008-08-15Corrected version
2011-06-01

**Information technology — Security
techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT
security —****Part 2:
Security functional components***Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Critères
d'évaluation pour la sécurité TI —**Partie 2: Composants fonctionnels de sécurité*Reference number
ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008(E)

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Published in Switzerland

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Foreword

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ISO/IEC 15408-2 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, *Information technology*, Subcommittee SC 27, *IT Security techniques*. The identical text of ISO/IEC 15408 is published by the Common Criteria Project Sponsoring Organisations as Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. The common XML source for both publications can be found at <http://www.oc.ccn.cni.es/xml>

This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO/IEC 15408-2:2005), which has been technically revised.

ISO/IEC 15408 consists of the following parts, under the general title *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security*:

- *Part 1: Introduction and general model*
- *Part 2: Security functional components*
- *Part 3: Security assurance components*

This corrected version of ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008 incorporates miscellaneous editorial corrections mainly related to FDP_UTC, FDP UIT, FDP_ACF.1.4, FAU_SEL.1.1, FPT_TST.1, FDP_ITT.4, and FPT_TEE.

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Introduction

Security functional components, as defined in this part of ISO/IEC 15408, are the basis for the security functional requirements expressed in a Protection Profile (PP) or a Security Target (ST). These requirements describe the desired security behaviour expected of a Target of Evaluation (TOE) and are intended to meet the security objectives as stated in a PP or an ST. These requirements describe security properties that users can detect by direct interaction (i.e. inputs, outputs) with the IT or by the IT response to stimulus.

Security functional components express security requirements intended to counter threats in the assumed operating environment of the TOE and/or cover any identified organisational security policies and assumptions.

The audience for this part of ISO/IEC 15408 includes consumers, developers, and evaluators of secure IT products. ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, Clause 5 provides additional information on the target audience of ISO/IEC 15408, and on the use of ISO/IEC 15408 by the groups that comprise the target audience. These groups may use this part of ISO/IEC 15408 as follows:

- a) Consumers, who use this part of ISO/IEC 15408 when selecting components to express functional requirements to satisfy the security objectives expressed in a PP or ST. ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, Clause 6 provides more detailed information on the relationship between security objectives and security requirements.
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Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security —

Part 2: Security functional components

1 Scope

This part of ISO/IEC 15408 defines the required structure and content of security functional components for the purpose of security evaluation. It includes a catalogue of functional components that will meet the common security functionality requirements of many IT products.

2 Normative references

The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

ISO/IEC 15408-1, *Information technology — Security techniques — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1: Introduction and general model*

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