

## Spoločné bezpečnostné požiadavky pre rádiové zariadenia Časť 1: Rádiové zariadenia pripojené k internetu

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Common security requirements for radio equipment - Part 1: Internet connected radio equipment

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# Common security requirements for radio equipment -Part 1: Internet connected radio equipment

Exigences de sécurité communes applicables aux équipements radioélectriques - Partie 1 : Équipements radioélectriques connectés à l'internet

Gemeinsame Sicherheitsanforderungen für Funkanlagen - Teil 1: Funkanlagen mit Internetanschluss

This European Standard was approved by CEN on 1 August 2024.

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### **European foreword**

This document (EN 18031-1:2024) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/CENELEC JTC 13 "Cybersecurity and Data Protection", the secretariat of which is held by DIN.

This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by February 2025, and conflicting national standards shall be withdrawn at the latest by February 2025.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent rights. CEN shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

This document has been prepared under a standardization request addressed to CEN-CENELEC by the European Commission. The Standing Committee of the EFTA States subsequently approves these requests for its Member States.

For the relationship with EU Legislation, see informative Annex ZA, which is an integral part of this document.

Any feedback and questions on this document should be directed to the users' national standards body. A complete listing of these bodies can be found on the CEN website.

According to the CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organisations of the following countries are bound to implement this European Standard: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the United Kingdom.

#### Introduction

Vigilance is required from manufacturers to improve the overall resilience against cybersecurity threats caused by the increased connectivity of radio equipment [33] and the growing ability of malicious threat actors to cause harm to users, organizations, and society.

The security requirements presented in this baseline standard are developed to improve the ability of radio equipment to protect its security assets and network assets against common cybersecurity threats and to mitigate publicly known exploitable vulnerabilities.

It is important to note that to achieve the overall cybersecurity of radio equipment, defence in depth best practices will be needed by both the manufacturer and user. In particular, no single measure will suffice to achieve the given objectives, indeed achieving even a single security objective will usually require a suite of mechanisms and measures. Throughout this document, the guidance material includes lists of examples. These examples given are only indicative possibilities, as there are other possibilities that are not listed, and even using the examples given will not be sufficient unless the mechanisms and measures chosen are implemented in a coordinated fashion.

# 1 Scope

This document specifies common security requirements and related assessment criteria for internet-connected radio equipment [34] (hereinafter referred to as "equipment").

### 2 Normative references

There are no normative references in this document.

koniec náhľadu – text ďalej pokračuje v platenej verzii STN